Preston Padden, the Director of the EOBC, said the following about the study:
"Attached is an updated Paper from expert auction economist Peter Cramton and related Talking Points. The new results and conclusions in the Cramton Paper are summarized on pages 3 and 4. EOBC presented the Talking Points and the Paper to the FCC Auction Task Force Staff...this is exactly the kind of fact based, data driven input that the FCC has requested.
Highlights include:
- We have done 180 new complete reverse auction simulations using the FCC's inter-service interference criteria AND an industry-informed model of Station reservation, or exit, prices. No one else has done this.
- The simulations show that EOBC's alternative starting price formula produces a more robust auction at only 5% more cost to the government.
- The simulations show that using the base case for Station reservation prices (we ran simulations at 50%, 100%, 150% and 200% of base case) the FCC can clear 126 MHZ for $35 Billion. Cramton estimates the forward auction revenue from wireless carriers to be $84 Billion.
- The simulations show that, using EOBC's alternative starting price formula, and a "clock price" of $1500 instead of $900, the FCC can clear 126 MHZ with minimal impairment and with only very few markets in which a top four Network affiliate, Univision affiliate, or top-rated public broadcaster relinquishes its spectrum. Even in those few instances, it is highly likely that the stations would continue to broadcast either through channel sharing or a move to VHF.
- The simulations show that, using EOBC's alternative starting price formula, and a "clock price" of $1500 instead of $900, DRP is not necessary because as few as 13 Stations would freeze at round zero and they can be handled by a more simple and transparent "Round Zero Reserve".
- The Cramton Paper and Talking Points also argue for no delay of the auction, for a more simple way to set the clearing target, for greater transparency for broadcast bidders, for smaller bidding decrements and for intra-round bidding.
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