Fourth Circuit Opinions
M.P. v. Department of Children and Families, 159 So.3d 341 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)
The Father appealed an Order of Adjudication of Dependency and Order of Disposition and Case Plan Approval. The Fourth District Court of Appeal (Fourth DCA) affirmed adjudication but reversed and remanded as to unsupported findings in the orders and the instruction for the Father to submit to random drug testing.
The dependency petition as to Father alleged that he had minimal contact with the children and failed to protect them from Mother's drug use and Mother's abusive paramour. The only mention of drug use with regard to Father was an allegation that he had a criminal history involving drug possession. No evidence was presented at trial as to Father's alleged criminal history of drug possession, that Father abused drugs, or that Father's failure to protect the children from Mother's drug use and neglect was related to any substance use by Father.
Although the Fourth DCA pointed out that the allegation of a criminal history of drug possession placed the question of Father's substance abuse in controversy, the Fourth DCA did not find there was a showing of good cause for Father to submit to a substance abuse evaluation pursuant to Florida Statute ? 39.407. The trial court also failed to show that a substance abuse evaluation would meaningfully address the facts and circumstances which resulted in adjudication as to Father, as required by Florida Statute ? 39.603(1)(f).
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A.S. v. Department of Children and Families, 2015 WL 1448507 (Fla. 4th DCA)
Father appealed termination of his parental rights. The Fourth District Court of Appeal (Fourth DCA) reversed the termination holding that the trial court erred in finding that Father abandoned his child and that termination was the least restrictive means to protect the child.
J.A. was born in September of 2012 and placed in care immediately thereafter. The Department of Children and Families filed for termination on the basis of abandonment in December 2012. Father was one of several men that Mother thought might be the child's father. Mother did not name Father as a possible father until six months after the child's birth, when she named him during a court hearing in February 2013. After two missed paternity tests and a missed hearing on a motion to establish paternity, Father took a paternity test in August of 2013 but did not learn he was positively identified as the father until December of 2013. Father testified that he did not reach out to the testing company himself because he thought they would contact him if he was found to be the father. The Department did not conduct a diligent search for Father as required by Florida Statute ? 39.0136(1).
In reading the statute regarding abandonment with the definition of "parent" contained in Florida Statute ? 39.01(1), which limits the term as follows: "the term does not include . . . an alleged or prospective parent, unless the parental status falls within the terms of s. 39.503(1) or s. 63.062(1)," the Fourth DCA held that Father, as a prospective parent, could not have abandoned his child prior to establishment of his paternity. The Fourth DCA found that Father's actions after the establishment of paternity did not justify a finding that he abandoned his child by clear and convincing evidence. The testimony established that from March of 2014 when Father was first permitted visitation until the termination trial he was on pace to see his child on a weekly basis.
The Fourth DCA also found that termination of Father's paternal rights was not the least restrictive means to protect the child from harm. In abandonment cases, the Department is not required to offer the parent a case plan with a goal of reunification but must show that the Department "made a good faith effort to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family, such as through a current performance agreement or other such plan for the present child," Padgett v. Dep't of Health and Rehabilitation Services, 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1991), and that the parent will not benefit from court ordered services. C.A.T. v. Dep't of Children and Families, 10 So. 3d 682, 684 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009).
In the instant case, Father was never offered a case plan or provided any services. The only testimony that the child would suffer harm if reunited with father was disputed testimony that the child returned from visits with dirty diapers and occasionally had night terrors.
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M.N., Jr. v. Department of Children and Families, 2015 WL 1545230 (Fla. 4th DCA)
Father appealed the order dismissing his second motion to set aside a judgment of adoption. Both of Father's motions alleged that he was not provided proper notice. Father's first appeal was dismissed as untimely. The trial court found his second motion to be barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The Fourth District Court of Appeal (Fourth DCA) found that res judicata was incorrectly applied because the trial court did not address the notice issue in its first denial. However, the Fourth DCA affirmed dismissal based on timeliness. Florida Statute ? 63.182(1) requires that an action to set aside an adoption may not be filed more than one year after the judgment terminating parental rights. Father's second motion was filed past the one year deadline.
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B.K. v Department of Children and Families, 2015 WL 1652761 (Fla. 4th DCA)
Father appealed termination of his parental rights. He alleged that his incarceration did not warrant termination as it was not for a significant portion of the child's life. He further argued that termination was not the least restrictive means of preventing harm to the child.
At the time of the termination hearing, Father's child was almost six years old. She had been in foster care for the first year and a half of her life, placed with her mother for two years, removed and placed back in foster care, and three months later placed with her two half-siblings in a pre-adoptive foster home. Father was incarcerated her entire life and did not anticipate release until 2017.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal (Fourth DCA) examined Florida Statute ? 39.806(1)(d)(1), which provides ground for termination of incarcerated parents. The section was amended in 2012. The amendment changed a ground for termination when the period of time for which the parent is expected to be incarcerated will constitute a "substantial portion" of the child's minority to "a significant portion" of the child's minority. The Statute also requires that the court must consider the period of time of incarceration starting the date of actual incarceration, the child's age and the child's need for a permanent and stable home. The Fourth DCA cited to B.C. v. Florida Department of Children and Families, 887 So. 2d 1046, 1053 (Fla. 2004), which held the state must also show clear and convincing evidence that reunification with the parent poses a significant risk of harm and that termination is the least restrictive means to protect the child from harm.
The Fourth DCA found that the fact that Father will ultimately have been incarcerated for almost 50% of the child's life, the child's young age, and the remaining time left of Father's incarceration before he would be available to take custody of the child was competent, substantial evidence that weighted in favor of termination and on the actual effect of incarceration on the parent-child relationship.
The Fourth DCA turned next to the manifest best interest analysis of termination as set forth in Florida Statute ? 39.810. In the instant case, there was no relative placement available; Father's incarceration prevented him from meeting the child's needs; the child had no bond with her father and did not know who he was; the child was doing well in her placement; the child was placed with her siblings; the child was bonded to her foster parents and in a pre-adoptive home; and the child was not at an age where continuing in long-term foster care was appropriate. Although the Fourth DCA found Father's desire to remain in his child's life and his attempts to maintain contact with his child admirable, the Fourth DCA found that it did not "trump the need to establish permanency and stability in S.C.'s life."
Finally the Fourth DCA examined whether termination of parental rights was the least restrictive means to protect the child from harm. The Fourth DCA held that termination was the least restrictive means of protecting the child "from the harm of continued instability in her life" because the child was bonded with her caregivers and there was no other permanent custody arrangement available.
Although the Fourth DCA did uphold termination, the case was remanded to the trial court to consider whether an order for post termination contact with Father is in the child's best interest pursuant to Florida Statute ? 39.811(7)(b).
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D.S. v. Department of Children and Families, 2015 WL 1810315 (Fla. 4th DCA)
Father appealed termination of his parental rights based upon his incarceration. The Fourth District Court of Appeal (Fourth DCA) reversed as to two of his three children, finding as to those children that termination was not supported by competent substantial evidence, that termination was not in the children's manifest best interest or that termination was not the least restrictive means to protect the children from harm.
Father was incarcerated a month prior to the children being removed from their mother with an anticipated release in 2017 or 2018. Two of his three children were placed with their paternal aunt. Father maintained consistent contact with them in the form of weekly letters, two to three phone calls per week, and several contact visits at the prison. Paternal aunt testified at the termination trial that the children were excited when Father called, called him "daddy" and had a bond with their father. She testified that she was willing to be a permanent guardian for the children but uncertain about the long-term commitment of adoption.
As with the previous summarized case, the Fourth DCA cited toB.C. v. Florida Department of Children and Families, 887 So. 2d 1046, 1054 (Fla. 2004), which held that a determination terminating parental rights "cannot rest exclusively on the length of incarceration. The actual effect of incarceration on the parent-child relationship must also be considered in light of the additional statutory and constitutional requirements." The Fourth DCA explained that this analysis must be both quantitative and qualitative.
In the instant case, Father's incarceration amounted to 27%-33% of the children's lives, an amount that was not a substantial portion of the children's minorities according to the Supreme Court in B.C. The children were in a stable home with relatives, maintained contact with their father and would maintain contact with the relatives if ultimately reunified with Father upon his release. There was no evidence presented of any harm to the children if they waited until Father's release to be reunified. The Fourth DCA found the fact that the aunt had not made a decision about adoption an important factor.
Finally, the trial court failed to apply the manifest best interest factors with an appreciation of the restrictions of incarceration as instructed by B.C. and failed to prove that termination was the least restrictive means to prevent harm. The Fourth DCA repeated that no evidence was presented at trial that there would be any harm to the children if father's rights were not terminated.
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